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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN LABOR DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
JE sE FREIDIN*
It is difficult to conceive how, in the long run, the public interest in the settlement
of labor disputes can be successfully distinguished from the common interests of
labor and management. The welfare of the nation is dependent on the success with
which the worker and the employer, fulfill their respective functions. No policy,
regardless of how it is labeled, can effectively serve the public interest which does not
serve the interests of democratic trade unionism on the one hand and the system of
private enterprise on the other. Nor can a policy succeed that does not contain
within itself respect for the economic and personal liberties of all citizens, regardless
of the side of the table at which they sit. Consequently, when, in the language of
the policy makers, we speak of the "public interest," we have-under discussion not
a system of devices designed to protect one autonomous group of the population
from attack by two others, equally independent, but a program that must be calcu-
lated to promote the interests of both workers and employers, for to one of these cate-
gories most citizens belong.
And so this paper will not discuss a program designed to immunize nonpartici-
pants against the consequences of labor disputes. Instead, the discussion will be
based on the premise that the public interest will best be served by'the formulation
and acceptance of a program devised to serve the common aspirations of industry
and labor to promote industrial peace without sacrificing basic concepts of eco-
nomic and personal liberty.
I
I doubt that during the eighteen months following V-J Day there occurred a
single major labor dispute that did not end up with editorial demands for amend-
ment of the National Labor Relations Act. The authors of these demands appear
to have accepted what seems to be a misconception of that statute. They have
assumed some necessary casual relation between the Act's provisions and the inability
of a particular company and union to agree on the terms of a collective bargaining
contract1  There is, of course, no such immediate or direct relationship. The
National Labor Relations Act was neither conceived nor enacted, nor could it
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'In this regard a recent Gallup poll has revealed some very provocative results. In response to the
question, "What is your understanding of what the Wagner Labor Act provides-or is supposed to do?",
x9% of those interviewed indicated "that they have at least a general idea of what the Act is, while
za% gave a totally incorrect answer, and 69% said they simply do not know what the Wagner Act
k." Washington Post, Jan. 1o, 1947, p. 9, col. 5.
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have been administered, as a means of resolving disputes over basic contract con-
ditions between organized workers, acting through their duly designated bargain-
ing representative, and their employer. Probably the most explicit negation of any
such purpose is to be found in the 1935 report of the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, to whom the pending measure had been referred:
Prudence forbids any attempt by the government to remove all the causes of la6or disputes.
Disputes about wages, hours of work and other working conditions should continue to
be resolved by the play of competitive forces, so far as the provisions of codes of fair com-
petion are not controlling. 2
Congressional ambitions at the time were relatively modest. To give "definite
legal status to the procedure of collective bargaining" was the limited purpose of the
enactment.3 The record of industrial strife in manufacturing industries during the
period preceding 1935, in contrast to the relative peace that had prevailed in the
railroad industry consequent upon legislation' that had consistently recognized and
sought to protect the right of railroad workers to organize and bargain collectively,
persuaded Congress that it was feasible-to eliminate at least that one issue from the
area of contention.
The Wagner Act therefore addresed itself only to the issue of how, peacefully,
the parties were to be brought up to the collective bargaining table. From there
they were on their own, their disputes to be resolved by the "play of competitive
forces."
Success in accomplishing the avowed purpose of the Act, if honest recognition is
given to its limited purpose, has been marked, though it was by no means im-
mediate. The best indication of how gradual has been acceptance of the orderly
procedures established by the Act to resolve questions of organization and repre.
sentation is to be found in the tenth annual report of the National Labor Relations
Board, which reflects a consistent rise in the ratio of representation cases to unfair
labor practice cases. In 1937, for example, unfair labor practices comprised 71 per
cent of all cases filed with the Board, as against 29 per cent representation cases. In
.94I the trend toward representation cases started. They constituted 47.4 per cent
of the cases filed. In 1945 this figure had jumped to 75 per cent, in sharp contrast
to the 19 per cent proportion of 1936!
II
We would consequently be mistaken were we to attribute to the Wagner Act
exclusive or major responsibility for the strikes of 1945 and 1946. In fact, it is note-
" SEN. REP. No. 573, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1935).
" Congress had before it at the time data establishing the fact that 74% of all the disputes that had
come before the then existing National Labor Relations Board during the second half of 1934 were over
the employer's refusal to recognize the employees' right to bargain collectively through their own repre-
ventatives.
'Beginning with the Act of Oct. x, x888 (25 STAT. 501) and culminating in the 1934 amendmets
to the Railway Labor Act (48 STAT. 1185). See 45 U. S. C. §151 et seq. (1940).
s 'o N. L. R. B. ANN. REP. 2, 3 (1946).
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worthy that not one of the major disturbances during those years involved the
once popular issue of organization and the right to bargain collectively. The truth
of this conclusion is demonstrated in a report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics on
x945 work stoppages. Not a single major dispute in 1945 involved the issue of
union recognition with respect to production workers. Only two disputes involved
the issue in any form, and both of those related to the still unsettled question of
supervisory employees.' Less than 4 per cent of the time lost through strikes, fewer
than 14 per cent of the workers involved in strikes, and only 12 per cent of all dis-
putes included controversy over the question of union recognition. To be contrasted
with these facts is the data covering the years 1935-1942, when more than 50 per
cent of all labor disputes were over that single question.
There is, then, no obvious correlation between the present form of the Wagner
Act and the recent strikes in major industries. It is possible to attribute responsi-
bility to the Act only if we are prepared to say that Congress misplaced its confi-
dence when, in adopting the Act, it contemplated that differences over wages, hours
and working conditions would be resolved through collective bargaining. Sober
reflection as to the sources and causes of the industrial strife since V-J Day, the large
proportion of disputes peacefully resolved through negotiation, and the relative in-
experience in collective bargaining of the parties to strike cases will indicate that
any such conclusion would be premature.
In the first place, attention has been too readily diverted from the normal to the
exceptional. Far too little attention has been focused on the successes rather than
the failures of collective bargaining. If one were to base a judgment only on news
reports of labor relations one would need to conclude that strike is the rule and
peaceful agreement the rare exception. The truth, however, is quite the reverse.
The dramatic strike rather than the sober agreement may compel the attention of
news reporters, but in a deliberate and careful appraisal of national labor policy
the success of the process of free and peaceful persuasion must be given honest
weight. The fact is that more than 8o per cent of all organized workers have resolved
new contract conditions without strikes or other interruptions of production since
V-J Day.7 Nor, in determining whether the character and extent of the disputes
that resulted in strikes during 1945-46 are typical of labor relations in normal cir-
cumstances, is it possible to overlook the unique problems that. had to be faced.
Industry and labor had to grapple with wholly novel issues of the severest difficulty,
agreement had to be sought in an atmosphere charged with great tension, and in
6 Work Stoppages Caused by Labor-Management Disputes in 1945, B. L. S. Bull. No. 878 (U. S.
Dept. Labor 1946). "Major dispute" here means one involving o,ooo or more workers.
4& The question whether foremen as a class are entitled to the rights of sell-organization, collective
bargaining, and other concerted activities assured to employees generally by the National Labor Relations
Act was not finally decided until Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 67 S. Ct. 789 (March 1o, 1947)-
This decision also upheld the power of the board to treat foremen as a class as an "appropriate bargain-
ing unit." [Ed.]
Ibid.
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many situations these highly challenging problems were approached by companies
and unions unskilled in dealing with each other.
Prior to 1935 union organization in mass-production industries was relatively
unknown. Organized labor consisted of approximately three million employees con-
centrated in the mining, construction, transportation, maritime and needle-trades
industries. In automobiles, steel, electric equipment, meatpacking, textiles, and other
large-scal manufacturing processes, aggressive, independent unions simply did not
exist. Nor did they spring full grown from the passage in 1935 of the Wagner Act.
Until 1937, when the constitutionality of the Act was finally accepted, there was not
much more than a pretense at collective bargaining. Even organizational efforts
remained more or less moribund. In 1937 the battle of organization began, with the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts for some time thereafter busily
occupied in meeting both bona fide and mala fide efforts to avoid the compulsions of
the Act. From that time until our entry into the war the major efforts of the unions
in the mass-production industries were concentrated more on achieving a representa-
tive status in the mills and factories of the tountry than on trying to negotiate
collective-bargaining agreements. This is reflected in the fact that from 1935 to 1942
the issue of union recognition alone accounted for more than half of all labor dis-
putes in the nation.
From 1941 until the end of the war the restrictions of a wartime economy, the
imperative needs of uninterrupted production and economic stabilization, and a
nearly completely regimented society almost eliminated the opportunity for free
collective bargaining. There was little opportunity for labor and industry to gain
during the war years any experience in devising joint solutions to mutual problems.
The wartime readiness of the government to make decisions deprived both sides
of an educative experience. The war did, however, furnish the source of the per-
plexing problems that had to be faced in the postwar adjustment. The fight over
price control had transformed many wage disputes between an employer and a union
into price disputes between an industry and the government. At the war's end
workers suffered losses in income resulting from the shortened work week, down-
grading of employees, shifts of great groups of workers from high- to low-paying
industries, the stricter administration of incentive systems; and then came the con-
stant and sharp rise in living costs. For the worker the economic impact of these
developments was unquestionably intensified by the emotiofial release from wartime
wage controls. Nor were the employers' problems a great deal easier. In* 1945,
for the first time in five or six years, cost reassumed its traditional importance. The
guaranteed.wartime market, ready to consume and pay any price for whatever could
be produced, was about to be replaced by a competitive economy in which a producer
could without much difficulty find himself priced out of the market.
It surely could not have come as a shocking surprise to those who were familiar
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with the sudden growth and development of organization in the mass-production
industries that not all companies and unions were able to find their own solutions
to all problems. The really gratifying fact is that so many did. There are, how-
ever, two noteworthy factors of which not sufficiently frequent mention has been
made. One is that violence and lawbreaking in strike conduct was largely non-
existent. Each party recognized and respected the other's right to disagree. In
itself this is a development of significance when considered in the sequence of the
long and bitter struggle to establish collective bargaining as one of the principles
of our democratic society. The other notable fact is the extent of agreement that
prevailed in industries in which collective bargaining had attained a measure of
maturity-agreement reached without strike or lockout, in the face of the most
trying of circumstances, and covering some 8o per cent of all workers who were
members of labor unions. Parenthetically, it is of interest to note that in the strikes
which did occur the AFL and CIO were about equally involved. That is to say,
unions affiliated with the CIO were involved in 4o per cent of the stoppages that
occurred in 1945, AFL unions were connected with 37 per cent, and unions affiliated
with neither of the two major labor organizations were involved in about 17 per
cent.8
Three conclusions of ultimate importance emerge from these facts:
(i) The National Labor Relations Act has succeeded in its limited immediate
purpose of removing the issue of union recognition from the area of labor-manage-
ment controversy.
(2) In the peaceful settlement of the vast majority of labor disputes through
collective bargaining, even in the difficult immediate postwar year, the Act has also
achieved a substantial measure of indirect success.
(3) We have had only a limited collective-bargaining experience in the mass-
production industries, where the preponderant majority of workers who participated
in strikes are employed, and even that limited experience has been chiefly confined
to unique economic circumstances. Where, on the other hand, the parties entered
into their 1945 negotiations with a mature experience in dealing with each other,
strikes were relatively unknown.?
III
Honest and dispassionate consideration of these conclusions ought to remind us
of the danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water. For while their accept-
ance does not preclude efforts to review and improve the national labor policy, there
is a real threat that in the heat of present public concern an intemperate or hastily
conceived program will be formulated that will have the effect of permanently in-
juring the processes of free collective bargaining.
s Id. at 22.
9 For example, in the apparel industry only 1.7%, in the printing industry 3.7%, and in the con-
struction industry 5.8% of all the workers employed were involved in strikes. In all three industries
union organization is extensive. The comparable figure for all manufacturing is x9.6%. (Id. Table 4).
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It must be realized that the present unbalance of labor's power is not so much
due to the inherent nature or strength of labor unions as to the strength of the eco-
nomic forces now at work, forces that are characteristic of an economy of scarcity-
labor shortages and the need for maximized production. The great danger is a re-
fusal to recognize this fact, and a willingness instead to assume that the extent of
the power now possessed by the organized worker and the pervasive effects of its
exercise are necessary elements of a strong labor movement operating in a normal
economy rather than the result of a set of exceptional economic circumstances. Our
entire governmental effort is being directed toward a return to a normal economy.
It would be illogical to base a reappraisal of our labor policy on the premise, so
wholly at odds with this overriding governmental aim, that the emergent forces of
the immediate postwar period, predominantly responsible for recent labor unrest, will
continue. The objective of our reappraisal must therefore be to buttress and support
the processes of free collective bargaining, on the assumption that we are headed for a
normal economy, and to eschew ill-considered compulsory devices which, if applied
at the beginning to wages, must eventually be applied also to prices, profits and pro-
duction. Free enterprise will not long be maintained once we have abandoned free
collective bargaining.
It is in this light that the public interest requires that proposals to change or
implement our national labor policy be considered. For it has become apparent to
the thoughful person that many of the proposals put forward ostensibly for the pur-
pose of encouraging free collective bargaining will have just the opposite effect.
Typical of those proffered panaceas are those that insist that the government must be
ready to intervene as decision-maker in major disputes when the parties are unable
to agree. Fact-finding in a variety of forms and compulsory arbitration are most
freqently offered as the machinery by which government is to execute this function.
But any device that holds out the government as an available instrument for
fixing wages, hours, and other conditions of employment impairs, to the extent of its
availability, the process of collective-bargaining. For in one party or the other to
many major disputes the hope will persist that more can be gained by appealing to
the government than by agreement; and the vicious circle is that, as the process of
agreement-making is thus weakened, the need for government intervention will
grow more critcial. Until the government makes as plain as the English language
permits that it is out of the decision-making business, there must be included in the
list of causes of strikes the desire to compel government intervention.
It is, moreover, not only in the immediate case that efforts to reach agreement are
prejudiced by the readiness of a government agency to make the decision. Others
in the same or related industries, or the same or adjacent areas, find themselves
bound by a decision made in a case to which they were not parties. Regardless of
protestations to the contrary, the undeniable fact is that from one or two major cases
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in which the decision (regardless of whether it is labeled a "recommendation" or
"finding") has been made by the government there emerges the equivalent of a
national policy (e.g., the i8/ 2-cent pattern of 1945-46) from which deviation in other
cases is extremely difficult if not wholly impossible, regardless of differences in wage
history, cost considerations, competitive outlook, nature of operation, product, or
even industry. The entire institution of collective bargaining is thus progressively
weakened by government's assumption of the role of decision-maker.
Nor will the compulsive character of official activities be lessened by labeling the
results as "findings" or "recommendations." Professions of the freedom of the par-
ties to reject or accept the findings or recommendations are simply double-talk. The
government's prestige, the force of public opinion demand obedience; indeed, the
avowed purpose of the procedure is to induce acceptance through the operation of
these forces.
Even in regard to limited categories of industries such as public utilities, to which
proposals for government intervention might be confined, the same considerations
are valid. It is, moreover, quite obvious that our integrated economy no longer per-
mits easy definition of "industries affected with a public interest," particularly when
what we are trying to define is a class of services the interruption of which entails
significant inconveniences for the community. As introduced in the House and
Senate, for example, the proposal for the creation of fact-finding boards'" covered
unsettled disputes certified by the Secretary of Labor as affecting or threatening to
affect "the national public interest and ... interstate and foreign commerce." Could
the steel, meatpacking, transportation, maritime, or coal industries be omitted from
such a broad definition? Could, in fact, any dispute involving several thousand work-
ers be left out, whether it occurred in the automobile or the textile industry, or any of
the other highly organized, mass-production industries? The War Labor Board's
wartime experience reveals the difficulty of drawing a reliable distinction between
disputes that threaten the public interest and those that do not. The criterion of
the Board's jurisdiction was an interference, actual or threatened, with the war effort,
evidenced by certification of the Secretary of Labor. It was soon found that strikes
or potential strikes could not be isolated nor confined within geographical bound-
aries, nor could their contagious effects on workers not immediately involved be pre-
cisely foretold. And it was not easy to explain to workers that their dispute was
not serious enough to warrant government's formal attention. The risk was "that
such a statement would be accepted as a challenge to aggravate the nature and
threatening quality of the dispute. As a consequence, all disputes were held to'-be
subject to the Secretary's certification because, with infrequent exceptions, each con-
tained the seeds of widespread and contagious industrial conflict. It is doubtful that
a peacetime agency could successfully resist the adoption of a similar practice.
Experience under the Railway Labor Act furnishes a very doubtful precedent
'*H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945).
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for broad extension of government intervention. As finally amended in 1934 it was,
in the first place, the result of long experience with and constant change of earlier
enactments which had sought unsuccessfully to deal with labor disputes in the rail-
road industry. The amendment of 1934 marked the culmination of fifty years of
legislative experiment in this field of mediation. Under the Act of i888, the Erdman
Act of 1898, the Newlands Act of 1913, the Adamson Act of 1916, government
possession during the first World War, and the Transportation Act of 1920 the re-
suits were dismal.1" Even as radically altered in 1926 and finally amended in 1934
the procedure has not been foolproof. Witness the railroad strike of 1946. But aside
from this half century of actual experience, the fact of critical importance is that,
as adopted in 1926, the Railway Ldbor Act was the result of joint agreement between
the unions and the carriers. If we are to be influenced by any precedent surely it
should be by this fact of voluntarism.
In contrast is the unanimity of the great organizations representing labor and
industry in vigorously opposing the application of the Railway Labor Act's fact-
finding or emergency-board techniques to the rest of industry."2
IV
There are, however, steps the government can take, designed to aid parties to a
labor dispute to reach their own agreement, but uncoercive in character. Two broad
categories of activities can be envisaged. The first would include expansion and
improvement of active government participation, limited, however, to mediation
and conciliation; the second would consist of collating and making available in-
formation pertinent to many of the pressing issues in over-all management-labor
relations as well as in particular disputes, and of furnishing personnel trained and
expert in the technical problems that affect worker and employer.
As to the first, the government's mediation techniques and facilities have not
kept pace with the growth in size and complexity of the problems of industrial re-
lations. Few, if any, changes have been made in the organization and extent of fed-
eral conciliation facilities since the service was first established in 192o. Recent efforts
of the Director of the Conciliation Service are very encouraging, however. He has,
for example, established three separate bodies-the first an over-all advisory commit-
tee; the second a group of labor and management representatives of a particular in-
dustry, public utilities; and the third a group of labor-management representatives of
a particular area, the Middle Atlantic states. This is a significant beginning of an
effort to achieve labor peace on the basis of voluntarism. It is important, too, be-
cause it recognizes that in some situations successful labor-management relations can
1125 STAT. 501 (1888); 30 STAT. 424 (898); 38 STAT. 103 (1913). 45 U S. C. §S1OI-125 (1940);
39 STAT. '721 (i9i6), 45 U. S. C. 5§65,66 (1940); 41 STAT. 456 (1920).
' See, for example, the recommendations of the U. S. Conciliation Service's Labor-Management
Advisory Committee, N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 5946, p. x, col. 2. See also N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1947.
p. 8, col. T.
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be encouraged if the problem is approached on an industry basis, while in others a
community or area basis is needed. And it may well be, although this is not clear,
that both specialized groups are to operate within the broad policies established by
the advisory committee.
The expansion of such experiments as these will far more effectively promote
industrial peace within the framework of a free economy than will any program
based on coercion, regardless of what it is called. Labor disputes do not fall into
logical patterns. Each is different from the others in issues, in character of past
relationships, in personalities involved, in technology, in wage-price ratios, in industry
and area repercussions. Experience has revealed that, because of such differences,
flexibility in mediation and conciliation methods is of fundamental importance. A
tripartite board of mediation will function successfully in some cases, a single media-
tor in others; area or community representatives will be effective in certain types of
situations while in others designees of the industry in which the dispute has arisen
will be able to exercise greater persuasive powers; in still other cases efforts of repre-
sentatives of the industry immediately involved will be resented because of reluctance
to disclose to competitors information of a confidential nature, while efforts of repre-
sentatives of a related or wholly different industry will be welcomed. In some cities
(New York and Toledo, Ohio, for example), local mediation facilities'will possess
advantages that state or federal agencies do not possess. Frequently different tech-
niques will be required to avoid a strike than to settle one that has already occurred.
An expanded conciliation service will not achieve maximum efficiency if limited
to a rigid or a single procedure. There must be in the hands of the responsible
administrator authority to adapt mediation techniques to the characteristics of in-
dividual situations. The defect of many of the proposals that have been made for
the establishment of super-mediation bodies is that they fail to take sufficient account
of this need for adaptability," and that they do not make plain that the government's
aid will be limited to mediation and conciliation and will stop short of making
official decisions or official recommendations in such form as to be tantamount to a
dictated settlement. It is doubtful, moreover, whether any net gain will result from
superimposing on the Conciliation Service a mediation agency with superior status.
The probability is simply that a lot of cases that might have been settled by concilia-
tion would be held out for the attention of the super-body in the hope that some ad-
vantage would accrue to one side or the other through the lapse of time necessary to
get from conciliation to the super-agency or through the force of some other circum-
stance. It is fairly common knowledge that as long as some higher forum or official
is available, the last ounce of effort toward compromise will not be made at the
lower level but will be withheld until the higher forum is reached and its efforts in-
voked.
" The Ball-Burton-Hatch bill, for example, would have made it mandatory for the federal concili-
ation agencies to intervene in important disputes. As the bill is now worded there would be no oppor-
tunity to consider whether state or local mediation facilities could be utilized more effectively.
376 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In any attempt to improve our mediation services the organization of government
mediation in Sweden and its record of substantial achievement is worth careful
study.14 The country has been divided into seven districts with a mediator for each
district. The mediator is given notice of the inception of negotiations which, by law,
must commence not later than three months prior to the expiration of the current
contract. He is thus qualified to enter the situation formally, should that become
necessary, by his familiarity with local circumstances bearing on the issues, with the
personalities representing the two sides, and with the particulars of the dispute. As
a consequence his competence and impartiality evoke the confidence of both sides.
The law establishing his office requires him carefully to report each case in which he
participates. His reports are printed each year in summary form by the Ministry of
Social Affairs, thus aiding in the establishment of responsibility of all participants in
the mediation process, including the mediator himself, and building up case records
to which other parties and mediators may have access. While the mediator has au-
thority to require the, parties to attend his meetings, all proposals for compulsory arbi-
tration of the terms of settlement has~e been consistently rejected. This latter fact is
true also of the proceduries in Denmark and Norway.
It is not suggested that the patterns established in the Scandinavian countries,
even though they have operated with marked success, would be adequate in this
country, where our economy and all the components of industrial relations are vaster
and infinitely more complex. But the experience of those countries, since the aspira-
tions of workers and employers in any free economy are substantially similar, should
surely be consulted before radical changes which would substitute coercion for free-
dom are enthusiastically embraced. There seems, for example, to be great merit in
establishing mediation districts, either by geographical or industry boundaries (uti-
lizing existing state and local mediation facilities); in vesting the officials of such
districts with sufficient discretion so that the various techniques described above
can be applied to the needs of different situations; in providing for ample time
(say, three months) for negotiations for new agreements; in keeping the appropriate
mediation official apprised of the beginning and development of bargaining; and in
maintaining case-history records as guides in other situations.
Here, it is submitted, is a fertile subject for study by the Labor-Management
Advisory Committee of the United States Conciliation Service. It is not clear
whether this group is to be. an organized, continuing body with recognizMd status,
but consideration might well be given to granting it Congressional recognition and
authorizing it to formulate, through agreement of its labor-management representa-
tives, basic general policies and operating devices. Experience during World Wars
I and II has demonstrated the fruitfulness of such a Continuing organization. It
could be of inestimable help, not only in settling major disputes through its own
efforts, but also in proposing procedures for the settlement of other disputes through
"
4 See PAUL H. NO.GREN, Tim SwEISH CoLLECTrV BARGAINING SYM-EM (1941), Csp. C, XI.
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local or district or industry representatives. Through liaison maintained with the
labor committees of the House and Senate, with the Secretaries of Labor and Com-
merce, and with other administrative officials concerned with labor policy, it could
also aid in legislative and administrative functions dealing with the maintenance of
industrial peace.
Such a group would possess the advantages of voluntarism, continuity of experi-
ence and policy, and adaptability. It would encourage agreement and stimulate
joint effort by representatives of industry and labor in the solution of single disputes
and in the formulation of broad policies.
V
There is a complementing service that might also be of assistance to industry
and labor in the making of their own agreements. As collective-bargaining relation-
ships acquire maturity the setting of wages and the adoption and modification of
working conditions become less and less matters of chance, and more and more
matters of sophisticated and rational discussion in which the possession of precise
information, accurate data, and intelligent understanding become of critical impor-
tance.
The invaluable service rendered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in compiling
cost-of-living and wage-and-hour data could be supplemented by the gathering of
information on other subjects that have assumed major importance in industrial
relations. The 1945 blow-up over the subsequently disavowed Wallace report15 and
the current fracas over the so-called Nathan report16 indicate, for example, the in-
creasing significance in the settlement of labor disputes of wage-cost-price relation-
ships. There is good reason to suppose that a clearer understanding of this subject
than presently available reports permit would be of significant aid to both sides in
resolving wage disputes.1" The study now being made under government auspices
of the feasibility and limitations of annual wage plans furnishes sound precedent
for a similar study of wage and price relationships. Nothing helps so much in pro-
moting co-operative efforts as does comprehension based on impartial sources of
information.
Questions of labor productivity and unit labor cost are similarly obscured by the
paucity of reliable information, and, so obscured, have been productive of much un-
necessary disagreement. A project is now under way18 to measure man-hours of
labor required per unit of production cost, volume of production, and labor costs
per unit of production. So far as news reports reveal, however, it ic uncertain
' N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1945, p. i, col. 6
'r ROBERT R. NATHAN and OSCAR Goss, A NATIONAL WAGE POLICY FOR 1947 (1946).
' On December 12, 1946, the Federal Trade Commission released some figures on the relation, by
industry, of labor cost to dollar sales. The ratio varied from 3.2 cents per dollar of sales in cigarjttes
and tobacco products to 33.2 cents in hat and cap manufacturing. The figures, however, were for 1939
and did not purport to be complete. N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1946.
"Productivity Changes Since z939 (1946) 63 Mo. LAB. Rrv. 893.
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whether labor is to have representation on the committee responsible for making the
survey or on whatever body is to have responsibility for interpreting the accumulated
data. Nor is it apparent whether this is to be on an industry or craft basis nor how
extensive its coverage is to be. If the results of this effort are to realize its fullest
potential utility it is important that the project be beyond any challenge as to bias or
coverage.
Related to questions of increased productivity and reduced unit labor cost are
problems of technological improvement and worker displacement. In the great ma-
jority of instances worker resistance to the introduction of labor-saving devices is a
natural reaction of fear of loss of the opportunity to earn rather than arbitrariness,
meanness of spirit, or reactionary desire to retard mechanical progress. But since in
the ultimate analysis it is economically possible to increase respective shares of the
production pie only by baking a larger pie, it is important that the resistance be over-
come; not, however, through such abortive devices as the Lea Act, but through
understanding and intelligent application of the history of technological advance, the
essence of which is that more and larger earnings opportunities are created than are
lost by improving technology. Here, too, the government, as the source of im-
partial analysis and information, can render useful service by a careful study of the
effects of technological innovations on earnings opportunities and by readiness and
ability in a particular situation to explore with company and union the probable
consequences of a contemplated machine innovation, change of operations, or mate-
rial, and methods by which the economic impact on the workers can be avoided or
minimized.
There are unquestionably many other directions in which the government could
exert fruitful effort in accumulating and making widely available information and
data to be utilized in individual disputes or as the basis for the formulation of
national policy. The success and mechanics of profit-sharing plans that might make
possible more generous worker participation during years of unusually profitable
operations, without raising the basic wage structure to a level which in ordinary or
lean years would constitute a competitive embarrassment to the employer, is .certainly
worth more official study than it has yet received. Various kinds of incentive sys-
tems, their methods of operation, their effects on production and earnings, and their
adaptability to operations and industries in which their introduction has been op-
posed, are another rich field of inquiry. Careful job analysis and evaluation and
the establishment of effective job differentials can do much to eliminate in-plant
dissatisfaction.
It is firmly believed that, if the government were able to make available not only
information on these matters, but also persons trained and expert in these fields who
could be invited by disputing parties to aid them in the solution of particular prob-
lems, the science of collective bargaining and its potential accomplishments would be
vastly enchanced.
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VI
The preceding discussion has dealt only with those aspects of government policy
that might encourage free and private agreement-making. But since the ultimate
result of that process is an agreement, the success of the entire policy must turn on
the honest adherence by both sides to the obligations and responsibilities explicit in
the agreement and implicit in the relationship. There cannot, in other words, any
longer persist any doubt regarding the enforceability of these agreements or the
availability of sanctions for their breach.
There is much misunderstanding as to the legal status of collective-bargaining
agreements. Contrary to popular impression they are enforceable, and have been
enforced by the courts in suits by employers, by unions and by employees. 9 A good
deal of the confusion results from the failure of the courts to define clearly the nature
of the rights being enforced or the legal character of the contract. Some courts, for
example, have adopted the theory that such agreements establish a usage or custom
which, by implication or express agreement, becomes a part of the individual employ-
ment contract,2" and that it is only this individual contract that is being enforced.
Such a theory is obviously defective in ignoring the relationship between the union
and the employer? 1 In other courts suits have been maintained on the ground that
the contract was made by the union as agent for the employees;22 and in others the
rationale has been that the contract is enforceable like any third party beneficiary
agreement. 3 It would be obviously desirable, because of the importance of the
interests not only of the immediate parties to the contract but of the entire commu-
nity in insuring the stability that inheres in firm labor contracts, for the courts to
1 "That any individual can obtain redress for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement is 'no
longer' an open question. I say 'no longer' because earlier courts accompanied their, shall we say rigid
attitude toward the working man or woman, generally, by a specific hostility to his rights under a
collective labor agreement. But modern judges, despite the divergence of theories adopted, will enforce
these agreements at the instance of employer, employee or union. Nor will specific enforcement be barred
by the ancient and now considerably weakened 'slavery' doctrine. Whatever the effect given to individual
employment contracts, collective agreements are held to be in a special category. So where money
damages are inadequate equity will enforce their terms." Clark, J. dissenting in N. L. R. B. v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 120 FED. 2d 262 (C. C. A. 3d 194r), cert. denied 314 U. S. 693 (1941).
"A union, although a voluntary unincorporated association, is legally responsible for its acts in
much the same way that an individual, a partnership or a corporation is responsible. If a union, through
its constituted agents, commits a wrong or is guilty of violence or of illegal oppression, the union, and
not merely the individuals who are the direct instruments of the wrong, can be enjoined or made
liable for damages to the same extent that the union could be if it were incorporated; and the funds
belonging to the unincorporated union can be reached to satisfy any damages which might be recovered
for the wrong done." BRsANDEis, BusiNEss--A PeoFEsszoN (1933) 93.
"System Federation v. Louisiana & A. Ry., x19 FED. 2d 509 (C.C.A. 5th x941); Hudson v. Cincin-
nati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (913). The major defect of this theory is that
it leaves unresolved the question of suit between the union and the employer.
"'Nederlandsch Amer. S. M. v. Stevedore's & Longshoremen's Ben. Soc., 265 Fan. 397 (E.D. La.
1920); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. SuPP. 401 (ist Dept. 1922).
"' Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fan. 225 (C. A. A. 6th x9o9); Mueller v. Chicago & N. AV. Ry., 194
MiNN. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935); Hall v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 224 Mo. APP. 431, 28 S. W. 2d 687
(1930); San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S. W. 2d 84 (Com. App. Tex. 1933).
"2 Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 24 F. SUs,,. 731 (S. D. Miss. 1938), aff'd. 312 U. S. 630 (1941);
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adopt or the legislature to establish a clear and uniform basis for enforcing these
agreements. 24
But aside from the uncertainty and lack of understanding as to judicial enforce-
ment of labor contracts, the factor that has probably been most responsible for the
reluctance of employers and unions to seek court relief is the complete unsuitability
of orthodox legal procedures. The time has surely come for the development of a
legal pattern that will protect the dominant public interest inherent in responsible
and bona fide collective bargaining by giving to the fruits of the process the widest
recognition and protection.25
In the search for such an appropriate procedure it will be apparent, in the infre-
quency with which court help has been invoked by either side, that traditional
judicial methods of enforcing commercial contracts are ill-adapted to the collective
agreement. Court proceedings are generally costly, they are prolonged and technical,
and courts are bound by statute and centuries of common law to invoke doctrines
and practices developed in other fields of law or in the days of smaller business
units and more personal employmmt relationships. Also important is the fact that
labor distrust of the judiciary, particularly of state and local courts, which originated
with the indiscriminate use of the injunction and with the treatment of labor organi-
zations as criminal conspiracies, has by no means been entirely dissipated. Another
factor that cannot be overlooked is the lack of expertness in labor matters to which
most judges would be the first to confess.
On an ever-increasing scale, therefore, the need for peaceful methods of settling
alleged breaches of the contract and for devising and imposing appropriate and
workable remedies and sanctions has been met by adoption of a system under which
all such claims, not settled by negotiation according to a defined procedure, are sub-
Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div.
293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3rd Dept. 1914).
For a thoughtful analysis of these theories (usage, agency and bencficiary) see Anderson, Collective
Bargaining Agreements (1936) 15 ORE. L. Re. 229, and Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in
American Labor Union Wor4ing Agreements (1933) 9 INo. L. J. 69.
"A note in (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 122r suggests that "the most effective legal formula capable of
contemporary use in the enforcement of collective agreements would be treatment of the agreement as
a valid contract between the employer and the union, creating a usage which becomes a part of all existing
and subsequent individual employment contracts, unless either the employer or the employee, with
actual knowledge of the agreement, voluntarily waives its benefits." Since the adoption of the Wagner
Act and the decisions in J. I. Case Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 332 (1944) and Order of R. R. Teleg-
raphers v. Railway Express Agency, * 321 U. S. 342 (1944), it is very doubtful whether the -employer
and an employee within the bargaining unit may agree to waive the terms of a collective agreement
negotiated by the exclusive representative.
5 In any discussion regarding the legal accountability of labor unions one cannot omit nor minimize.
the deep significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 192
(1944) and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman, 323 U. S. 210 (1944), in which the
Court upheld the right of Negro employees, not members of the union that represented their crafts,
to enforce by injunction and damages the duty of the union to represent all members of the craft im-
partially. See Note (1945) 58 HAxv. L. Rlv. 448, and Freidin and Ulman, Arbitration and the National
War Labor Board (x945) 58 HA.v. L. Rav. 309, 336-339.
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mitted to arbitration for final determination.2 6 It has not yet, however, been made as
certain and explicit as it should be that the jurisdiction of such an arbitrator includes
authority to act upon employers' claims of contract breach by the employees or the
union, and authority to impose suitable penalties.
What is called for, then, is a procedure for the enforcement of labor agreements
specially adapted to the collective-bargaining relationship. Every such agreement
should embody, either by specific agreement of the parties or by operation of law,
provisions for the resolution of claims of breach by either side. It should embody
also provisions for suitable remedies and the imposition of effective sanctions by an
impartial person or board, chosen preferably by the parties, but in default of their
agreement designated by an appropriate government official, it being clearly under-
stood that such a person.or board is to possess no authority to add to, subtract from,
or modify any provision of the basic agreement. With such a procedure available
for the peaceful resolution of "interpretational" disputes, no fair-minded person could
then oppose a no-strike, no-lockout clause, as a term, express or legally implied, of
each collective labor agreement.
Any such program designed to insure adherence to agreed-upon contract pro-
visions would also need to consider appropriate implementations of the Wagner
Act27 and possibly the Norris-LaGuardia Act.28 For there would then be little
justification for continuing to extend the immunities of those statutes to employees
who, in disregard of adequate peaceful procedures by which they can achieve redress
for their grievances, seek to utilize self-help.
Past experience indicates that in many situations practical considerations persuade
an employer, seeking to deal with breach of the agreement by individual employees
acting without union support or authorization, to look in the first instance not to the
courts nor to his right to discharge or suspend, but to the union to enforce discipline
among its members and adherence to the contract terms. Indeed, the willingness of
a union to assume this function and its capacity to carry it out constitute one of the
major reasons for insuring the union's status through provisions making union
membership a condition of employment. Consequently, there is sound reason for
bringing the union within the orbit of accountability for claimed breaches of con-
tract not only by itself but by its members. This result can be accomplished by en-
abling an employer, before he attempts himself to discipline an employee whom he
asserts has breached the contract, to call on the union to do so. If the union should
default in executing this responsibility the employer would then be free of the re-
strictions of the above-mentioned statutes in suitably disciplining the employees.
In that event, too, the union as well as the employee in question might well be con-
"' Trade Agreemnents 7927. B. L. S. Bull. No. 468 (U. S. Dept. Labor 1028) 6; Arbitration Pro-
vulins in Union Agreements., B. L. S. Bull. No. 78 (U. S. Dept. of Labor, 1944).
T 49 STAT. 449 (x935), 29 U. S. C. §150 et seq. (1940).
"m47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §1oT (1q40).
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sidered as having violated the contract terms-a question which, in the last analysis,
would be justiciable through the arbitration machinery already described.
In connection with this question of contract enforceability the Swedish experience
should also be of much interest.29 In Sweden too, prior to the adoption of legislation
specifically addressed to the question, the courts had decided that trade unions and
employers' organizations were responsible at law for breach of contract obligations.
But this precedent, established in 1915, was rarely used as the basis of litigation
in the years that followed. Largely the same as those that have obtained here, the
reasons were that the courts were notoriously slow in handling such cases and were
excessively limited by traditional legal concepts. Neither the unions nor the em-
ployers were anxious to start suits which might drag out over a year or more and
then yield highly unpredictable results. Prior legislative efforts in igio and 1916
"to promote industrial peace," both of which, be it noted, distinguished between
disputes incident to the making of new agreements (these to be subject only to medi-
ation) and "interpretational" disputes, had failed. But in 1928 the Independent-
Liberal coalition government introduced and succeeded in enacting the Collective
Agreement Law and the law providing for a labor court30  Leaving the making
of agreements to the parties, aided only by government rhediation facilities, and
leaving unaffected the strike or lockout as an essential part of the agreement-making
process, the former act outlaws strikes and lockouts over disputes regarding the ap-
plication or interpretation of an agreement, and sympathy strikes "if [the organiza-
tion being supportedl does not itself possess the right to take coercive measures,"
and provides that if either of the parties evades any of its contract responsibilities it
may be held liable for the damage sustained by the other.3 ' This latter provision
is the basis for the companion enactment, the labor court law, which establishes a tri-
bunal for the exclusive purpose of dealing with "interpretational" and similar dis-
putes, empowered to award damages, in the event of a breach, against the employer,
the union, or the individual employees. The tribunal is noteworthy in three respects-
its composition, its limited jurisdiction, and its flexibility in devising sanctions. Tri-
partite, it is composed of a chairman and two members representing the public, and
four additional members, two selected from designees of the Swedish Employers'
Advisory Board, and two from designees of the Federation of Trade Unions. Its
jurisdiction is limited to disputes regarding the interpretation of a contract. And,
probably of equal importance in the degree of success achieved, it is empowered
" See PA -L H. NORGREN, THE SWEDISH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Sys'rr. (194).
"o Id. c. XV. It may be of interest to the new Congress to notice that both of these statutes, which
have operated with notable success, were prepared by a commission of experts, specifically designated
for the purpose, after intensive study and consultation with organizations of employers and unions.
"i In addition to this general provision a supplementary clause provides: "If the degree of the de-
fendants' guilt, the injured party's connection with the origin of the dispute, the magnitude of the injury
inflicted or other circumstances warrant it, the amount of the damages awarded may be reduced, even
to the extent of full exoneration from liability. In no case may an individual worker be required to
pay damages in excess of 2oo Kroner."
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to exonerate any party from guilt partially or wholly, thus being enabled to limit its
decisions to the probable area within which they will be acceptable to both sides.32
Despite initial opposition by the Swedish unions, both acts have operated with
a high degree of success. Union claims have run the gamut-hiring, dismissal, hours
of work, classification, overtime, etc. Employer claims have been largely limited to
strikes or to boycotts during the term of the agreement.
For us the significance of the Swedish experience is the combination of volun-
tarism in the making of agreements and legal compulsion in enforcing adherence to
their terms. This is the aspect, it is submitted, that must furnish the key to a success-
ful and acceptable labor policy in a democracy.
VII
It has been suggested that a successful government policy must embody respect
for the personal and economic liberties of all citizens, employers and employees, and
that it must reject compulsion in favor of voluntarism. But it is not only the govern-
ment in formulating a policy whose actions must be so limited. Similar limitations
must obtain with respect to the practices of employers and unions who are to operate
within the policy. There is no justification, economic or social, for either discrimina-
tory employment practices by an employer or discriminatory membership practices
by a union.
Where closed shop, union shop, or maintenance of membership agreements make
continued membership in the union a condition of employment, it is essential that
the.procedure preliminary to expulsion from the union, which would be followed
automatically by discharge, meet fundamental requirements of fairness and due
process, and that the causes for expulsion, exclude the exercise of basic human privi-
leges. Most union constitutions and by-laws include such safeguards. But even
though the instances in which they do not are few, the injustice and the hardship
may be great and, because loss of seniority is involved, irremediable. Where mem-
bership in the union is a condition of getting a job in the first place discriminatory
exclusions from the union should be equally barred.
The legal right to enter into a contract that makes union membership a condition
of employment is a special exception, written into the Wagner Act, to the general
prohibition against discrimination on the ground of membership or non-membership
in a union. But this special statutory immunity should not be enjoyed by a union
which itself practices intolerance, nor should it be distorted into a vehicle for anti-
democratic practices.
In the Steele and Tunstall cases, 3 the Supreme Court determined that the union's
right to decide questions affecting its own membership does not include the right
to engage in racial discrimination. But there are other forms of equally unjustifiable
" Two-thirds of its decisions have been unanimous. Compare figures on the tripartite National War
Labor Board, with approximately 75% unanimity.
"See note 25, supra.
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discriminatory reprisals. In the Portland Lumber case,"4 for example, an employee
had been expelled from the union for acting as a watcher for a rival union at an
election ordered by the National Labor Relations Board. In the Wallace Corpora-
ton5 and the Clifs Dow Chemical Company cases,36 the expulsionse took place be-
cause the employees had previously supported rival unions. In other cases involving
questions independent of the Wagner Act employees have been expelled for criti-
cizing union officers and committees," for testifying in an arbitration proceeding in
favor of the company," for refusing to join in a strike in violation of an existing
agreement, 9 and for refusing to reduce their tempo of work 4
Solutions to some of these problems have been sought by the NLRB through
imposing on the employer the duty to refuse to discharge an employee pursuant to
the contract, notwithstanding loss of union membership, unless he is satisfied that
neither the ground nor the procedure of union expulsion deprived the employee of
fundamental rights. But this, it is submitted, is an incongruous way to reach an
obviously desirable result.41 The result could be accomplished more directly by
extending the Labor Relations Board's process to this type of discriminatory practice
and by authorizing it in appropriate cases to withdraw the special statutory exception
from any union whose constitution and by-laws fail to conform to minimum stand-
ards of fairness or who, in actual practice, honor such standards more in the breach
than in the observance. Furthermore, the determination of such basic policy con-
siderations is the true province of the legislature rather than of judicial or admin-
istrative bodies.
Many strong arguments have been marshalled by the unions against interference
with or supervision of their internal affairs. There is undoubtedly a good deal of
truth in their assertion that such efforts frequently are fronts for anti-union drives.
But while it may be conceded to be generally desirable, "a union's free and auton-
omous control of its membership ought not to be made a fetish. 14 2 If the union with
a closed-shop contract erects arbitrary obstacles in the way of membership or capri-
ciously exercises its powers of expulsion and suspension, the evils of discriminatory
monopoly are at once apparent.
Federal and state labor laws have expanded our concept of economic democracy
"Portland Lumber Mills, 64 N. L. R. B. 159 (1945).
5 Wallace Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 323 U. S. 248 (1944).
"Cliffs Dow Chemical Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 1419 (945); see also Southwestern Portland Cement
Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 1 (1945).
:* John Wood Mfg. Co., 17 L. R. R. MAN. 2671 (1945).
"Link Belt Co., 17 L. R. R. MAN. 2775 (1946).
:' Sheffield Steel Corp., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 121 (1945).
'0 Ford Motor Co., 14 L. R. R. MAN. 2625 (1944).
4"The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently reversed such an order of the NLRB directed
against the Aluminum Company of America. N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1946, p. 9, col. 3 (Not yet officially
reported). See also Freidin, Some New Discharge Problems Under Union Security Covenants, x946
Wss. L. Rav. 440.
"Willcox, The Triboro Case-Mountain or Molehill? (1943) 56 HARv. L. Rav. 576.
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by adding to the strength and prestige of labor unions. The steadily increasing
membership of unions and their economic and political significance point to the need
for procedures which promise internal democratic freedom to their members. Many
of the largest and most powerful unions have on their own initiative recognized
this necessity through appropriate provisions in their constitutions and by-laws.
Others have not yet done so. Their occasional practices of bringing about the dis-
charge of workers who seek to shift to another union or to exercise some other per-
sonal right operate to defeat the very freedom of choice which the labor laws, from
which they derive much of their strength, were designed to protect.
VIII
The single essential to the success of any national policy is, in the last analysis,
its broad and genuine acceptance by the people it is to affect. So it is with any
policy directed toward encouraging and preserving industrial peace. Unions must be
rid of the notion that they must fight continously and aggressively for their existence.
This must come about not through laws but through the positive actions of manage-
ment. And it seems obviously to management's and the nation's interest to put-
forth such efforts, for union insecurity is the manna upon which extremists feed. And
unions must assume the reciprocal obligation of developing a program demonstrating
their unqualified adherence to our system of private enterprise.
In the years immediately following adoption of the Wagner Act relatively little
was realized from the collective bargaining process, principally because employers
were still engaged in utilizing and abusing their concentrated strengths in an effort
to prevent the growth of trade unionism and its spread to the mass-production iri-
dustries. This, in turn, engendered in the unions a distrust of management as a
class, many indications of which still persist. Not distrust over some single issue,
but distrust generally of the bona fides of employers. Some of these practices have
now been outlawed, others voluntarily abandoned. Some still remain. And to the
extent that they are not abandoned they will continue to reflect an attitude which
will preclude full development of the mutual trust and understanding which must
furnish the base of stable and satisfactory relations.
But contemporaneous with the growth of union power since 1937 there have
developed a number of union practices which have provoked in many employers,
and in large segments of the public, if not a distrust of unions as a class, then an
uncertainty regarding the legitimate areas of collective bargaining, union objectives,
and the means adopted to secure those ends.
The likelihood of the success of a program based on the public interest in pre-
serving voluntarism in industrial relations will be considerably enchanced if both
sides are free of the resentments provoked by a perpetuation of such practices, each
one of which is probably minor, but which in the aggregate constitute a source of
major friction. This is not to suggest by any means that all the excesses on the one
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side have been removed. The daily news reports are proof enough of the contrary.
But at least broad definition of employer responsibility has been attempted by both
statute and case law. An equally deliberate effort is yet to be undertaken on the other
side. The possible lines of inquiry are many. They have been suggested in a nurm-
ber of recent articles and in proposed legislation in the consideration of Nyhich the
risks of mistake and injustice are increased by the emotions that are bound up in the
subject. But the stakes are high, for we are dealing not only with economic stability
but with the individual human rights of millions of citizens. Dispassionate and
careful results are most likely to come if they are the result of agreement, or at least
exploration, by such a joint body as a congressionally authorized labor-management
conference with a duty to report within a fixed time to a joint congressional com-
mittee.
The ultimate aim of such a conference might well be described as the determina-
tion of standards of impropriety, the application of which would bar guilty partici-
pants from the special benefits and immunities of such laws as the Wagner and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Such standards should be addressed both to the legitimacy
of trade-union objectives and the means adopted by unions to accomplish their
aims. One of the essential purposes of government is to draw distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate conduct; and this is a continuous process that must be
sensitive of and responsive to changes in the social and economic mores of the times.
No segment of society can insist on absolute freedom from this process of constant
reappraisal. A respected contemporary philosopher has observed 43 that "Like sci-
ence, liberalism insists on a critical examination of the content of all our beliefs,
principles, or initial hypotheses and on subjecting them to a continous process of
verification so that they will be progressively better founded in experience and
reason."
To say, as was said at the outset of' this paper, that the Wagner Act has largely
succeeded in accomplishing its avowed purpose-the elimination of controversies
regarding issues of organization and representation-is not to say that the Act in
its present form is the perfection of legislative efforts; nor is it, obviously, to conclude
that a decade of actual experience has not brought to light difficulties in its admin-
istration and new problems that it does not undertake to treat. Many of these
matters have recently been the subject of careful analysis. 4 Some have already been
legislatively treated (the Hobbs and Lea Acts);4 others are embodied in proposed
"COHEN', TH'iF FAITH OF A LIBERAL (1946) 8.
"See, for example, Gregory, Something Has to be Done, Fortune, Nov., 1946, 132; Note (1946)
59 HARX'. L. REv. 747.
'6o STAT. 420 (1946), 18 U. S. C. A., §42oa el seq. (Supp. 1946); 6o STAT. 89 (946), 47 U. S.
C. A. §5o6 (Supp. 1946). The Lea Act was held by a United States District Court to be unconstitu-
tional on the ground, among others, that it undertook to deprive broadcasting station employees of rights
that other employees continued to retain. U. S. v. Petrillo, i9 L. R. R. 2088 (N. D. I1. 1946).
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baw (Case Bill, Ball-Burton-Hatch Act.)' The dangers of this bits-and-pieces ap-
proach promlit me to suggest a broad, inclusive review by labor and management
representatives, culminating in a joint report to Congress. Such a review would
have the great advantage of being based upon a realistic understanding of the facts
of industrial life. It is not too much to hope that such realism would succeed in
charting out large areas of agreement on such questions as: strikes that violate poli-
cies embodied in federal statutes or that are in breach of existing agreements; picket-
ing that prevents entrance to and exit from the plant by supervisors not involved in
the strike or others who do not choose to join it; boycotts having for their purpose
not improvement in wages and working conditions, but total and unconditional
exclusion from the market or the maintenance of artifical price levels; the use of
abusive or false propaganda and the need for more clearly defining freedom of em-
ployers and unions to express their views during a labor dispute; and strikes or other
coercive measures intended to discourage the introduction of labor-saving devices or
improved techniques or materials.
These questions, involving the nature and extent of reciprocal rights and obli-
gations of labor and management, can properly be viewed as matters for joint in-
quiry. The jurisdictional strike, on the other hand, directly involves only the rights
and obligations of the unions, with management helpless to provide the solution al-
though it suffers directly from the dispute. This, then, is a problem that the unions
themselves must resolve or have government resolve for them.
The Wagner Act provides a procedure for the peaceful resolution of one kind
of inter-union difference. When the dispute between two unions is over the ques-
tion of which one has the right to act as the bargaining representative of a given
group of employees-when, in other words, an employer is faced with competing
claims of representation-he or either of the unions may petition the National Labor
Relations Board to decide the question, and the decision is enforceable in accordance
with the procedures of the Wagner Act.
With respect, however, to inter-union differences over the question of which
union's members are to perform certain categories of work, no such procedure is
available. The need for a mechanism to resolve this type of dispute was recognized
by organized labor during the war. At the instance of the War Labor Board agree-
ment was reached by the AFL and the CIO that jurisdictional differences of this
nature, if they could not be settled by the local unions immediately involved, would
be referred to the heads of the international unions or to the presidents of the AFL
and CIO. If the disputes were not disposed of in that way it was agreed that they
were to be submitted to final arbitration.
Peacetime finds us without any substitute machinery although the need for
some such procedure is patent. If organized labor cannot itself devise a means of re-
'6See Forsythe, The Settlement of Contract Negotiation Disputes: A Comparison of Proposed
Legislation, supra.
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solving such conflicts without needless and costly interruptions to production, then
government must assume the duty of finding a method, even though it might work
in less than zoo per cent of the cases. The NLRB procedure for dealing with con-
flicting claims of representation seems adaptable to the jurisdictional dispute over
assignment of work. There might well be procedure for a formal appeal to the
appropriate union heads in the event of a strike over such an issue. Upon their
failure to agree upon either a substantive settlement or a procedure for settlement the
government should be ready to appoint an arbitrator whose decision would be
accepted at final.
Here, too, it seems entirely possible to facilitate peaceful resolution of these dis-
putes by agreement in advance as to the standards that should normally govern the
unions in reaching agreement or the arbitrator in making his award. The feasibility
of advance definition of such standards is indicated by the War Labor Board's success
in acting on such disputes on the basis of the principle that the right to perform
various classifications of work, the question not being covered by specific contractual
provision between the company and either of Ihe unions involved, is to be governed
by local area of industry practice4
"'H. K. Ferguson Co., z3 WAj LW. REP. 418 (1944); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 WAR
LA. REP. 569 (1944).
New York City
December x, 1946
